Review	of	The	Value	of	Rationality	by	Ralph	Wedgwood Benjamin	Kiesewetter Forthcoming	in:	Ethics	(April	2019) Sometimes,	our	attitudes,	such	as	our	beliefs	and	intentions,	are	incoherent	in	a	way that seems to	make it appropriate to call	us irrational,	which in turn suggests that having such attitudes violates certain norms of rationality. An intensely debated question	in	contemporary	analytic	philosophy	–	often	discussed	under	the	heading	of the normativity of rationality – concerns the relevance of such norms and their violation.	In	his	seminal	article	"Why	be	rational?"	(Mind	114	[2005]:	509–563),	Niko Kolodny	raised	the	challenge	to	put	forward	a	positive	reason	for	complying	with	the norms	of	rationality.	Famously,	he	argues	that	no	plausible	reason	can	be	given,	and that	the	assumption	that	rationality	has	normative	significance	is	a	myth.	Not	everyone has	been	convinced	by	his	arguments,	but	many	(including,	most	notably	perhaps,	John Broome,	Rationality	Through	Reasoning	[Chichester:	Wiley	Blackwell,	2013])	remain doubtful	about	whether	the	normativity	of	rationality	can	be	vindicated. It is very natural to read	Ralph	Wedgwood's rich and sophisticated book	The Value of Rationality as a contribution to the debate between	Kolodny, Broome, and others, which aims to answer Kolodny's challenge and to reject his skeptical conclusion.	After	all,	according	to	what	Wedgwood	calls	the	"central	claim"	of	his	book, "the	term	'rational'	...	expresses	a	normative	concept"	(196).	The	first	chapter	presents four	objections	to	this	thesis.	Three	of	these	objections	are	dealt	with	in	chapters	2	and 3,	while	answering	the	fourth	–	which	is	explicitly	concerned	with	Kolodny's	challenge (38–39)	– is	the	task	Wedgwood	takes	up	in	"the	whole	rest	of	this	book"	(86).	Caution should be exercised, however, since	Wedgwood's understanding of both rationality and	normativity	differs in important respects from that	of	other	participants in the debate. Firstly, Kolodny and Broome are concerned with a pretheoretical notion of rationality, which is anchored in ordinary judgments about what is rational or irrational	(cf.	Kolodny	2005,	515).	In	contrast,	Wedgwood	is	mainly	concerned	with	a theoretical	notion:	he	qualifies	his	central	thesis	by	saying	that	"when	the	term	'rational' 2 is	used	in	such	branches	of	intellectual	inquiry	as	formal	epistemology	and	the	theory	of rational choice, it expresses a normative concept" (196). As is	well-known, in such theories	the	term	'rational'	is	often	used	in	highly	idealized	ways	that	do	not	necessarily reflect	ordinary	judgments	of	rationality	(for	example	when	the	theories	assume	that rational agents must be logically omniscient), and hence Wedgwood's notion of rationality	differs	from	Kolodny's	and	Broome's.	This	is	why	Wedgwood	spends	part	of his book discussing objections to the normativity of rationality that did not	worry Kolodny	and	Broome,	such	as	that	rational	requirements	based	on	an	idealized	notion of	rationality	cannot	be	normative	because	they	do	not	seem	to	entail	the	agent's	ability to	comply	(see	chapter	3).	Wedgwood	appears	to	assume,	however,	that	his	notion	of 'rationality'	is	broader	than	the	ordinary	one	that	Kolodny	and	Broome	focus	on	and thus	incorporates	the	rational	requirements	they	are	concerned	with.	In	this	way,	his project	is	of	more	general	interest	(in	particular	to	formal	epistemologists	and	decision theorists),	and	his	thesis	that	rationality	is	normative	is	even	more	ambitious	than	the one	that	Kolodny	rejected. Moreover,	while	Broome	and	Kolodny	aim	at capturing	ordinary judgments	of rationality	and	irrationality	in	terms	of	purely	structural	norms	of	rationality,	which govern	the	relations	between	what	Scanlon	has	dubbed	"judgment-sensitive	attitudes" (attitudes	such	as	beliefs	and	intentions),	Wedgwood's	conception	of	rationality	seems to include, in addition, all substantive internal norms of justification. For example, Wedgwood's notion of rationality includes doxastic norms that are conditional on sensory	experiences	(cf.	12),	such	as those	embraced	by internalist foundationalists about justification – norms that others would consider to be requirements of substantive rationality (which may be understood in terms of responsiveness to available reasons) that need to be distinguished from requirements of structural rationality	(or	rationality	as	coherence). Secondly,	Broome,	Kolodny	and	others	(including,	to	put	my	cards	on	the	table, myself	in	The	Normativity	of	Rationality	[Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2017])	adopt a	reason-oriented	picture	of	normative	significance,	according	to	which	the	view	that rationality	is	normative	can	–	and,	indeed,	should	–	be	spelled	out	as	the	thesis	that	a rational requirement to	f implies a (pro tanto	or decisive) reason to	f.	Wedgwood dismisses this approach. He even claims that "to achieve reliable insights into the 3 normativity of the notion of rationality, ... talk of 'reasons' is best avoided" (87). Wedgwood	presents	his	opposition	to	reasons	as	an	objection	to	the	so-called	'Reasons First' approach, according to	which the	notion	of a reason is the	most fundamental normative	notion	that	can	be	used	to	explain	other	significant	normative	notions	(see chapter	4).	However,	since	understanding	the	normative	significance	of	rationality	in terms	of	reasons	does	not	commit	one	to	the	'Reasons	First'	approach,	the	rejection	of this	approach	itself	does	not	put	such	an	understanding	into	question.	As	it	turns	out in	the	course	of	the	relevant	chapter,	Wedgwood	goes	much	further	than	denying	that reasons	come	first	–	he	denies	that	there	is	any	important	unified	notion	of	a	normative reason	at	all:	"there	are	innumerable	different	concepts	of	'normative	reasons',	none	of them	any	more	central	than	any	other"	(94). What is the alternative picture of normativity that Wedgwood proposes? Generally	speaking,	Wedgwood's	approach	might	be	described	as	putting	values	first: the	"most	fundamental"	normative	concepts	are	"the	concepts	of	all	the	various	kinds of	values"	(18).	Wedgwood	then	characterizes	the	deontic	in	terms	of	the	evaluative.	A somewhat	rough	characterization	of	his	contextualist	account	of	'ought'	is	that	'It	ought to	be	the	case	that	A	f-s'	is	true	just	in	case	A's	f-ing	maximizes	expected	value,	relative to	some	kind	of	value	and	relative	to	some	distribution	of	probabilities	over	possible worlds	(chapter	5).	Normative	reasons,	in	turn,	are	understood	in	deontic	terms	(as explanations	of 'ought' facts)	as	well	as in	evaluative	terms	(as ideal	motivations	or premises of good reasoning), with "normative-explanation reasons" and "idealmotivation	reasons"	constituting	different	notions	of	normative	reasons	that	are	not coextensional (chapter 4). Hence, on Wedgwood's picture, there is an "enormous variety	of	kinds	of	value"	(15);	each	of these	values	generates, together	with	all the many	possible	probability	distributions, a "great	proliferation	of 'oughts'" (14); and this	in	turn	gives	rise	(or	is	part	of	what	gives	rise)	to	an	even	greater	proliferation	of kinds	of	normative	reasons. As	far	as	the	normativity	of	rationality	is	concerned,	instead	of	understanding	it as the claim that rational requirements entail reasons, Wedgwood proposes to understand	it	as	involving	the	following	two	principles:	"(a)	rational	mental	states	... and	rational	mental	events	...	are	in	a	way	good	...;	(b)	if	a	thinker	is	rationally	required to	f, then there is a sense in	which the thinker ought to	f" (40). Since	Wedgwood 4 assumes in chapter 4 that a normative reason, in one sense, just is "a fact that contributes towards explaining a normative fact" (106), it follows – at least	on the assumption	that	the	'ought'	in	principle	(b)	isn't	entirely	unexplained	–	that	rational requirements	entail	normative	reasons: 1. If	you're	rationally	required	to	f,	then	you	ought	to	f. 2. If you ought to f, then there is some fact that contributes towards explaining	that	you	ought	to	f	(assumption). 3. A	fact	that	contributes	towards	explaining	that	you	ought	to	f	is	a	reason for	you	to	f. 4. Therefore,	if	you're	rationally	required	to	f,	then	there	is	a	reason	for	you to	f. Wedgwood	does	not	mention	that	his	view	has	this	implication,	presumably	because he	takes	it	to	be	a	relatively	uninteresting	consequence	of	the	more	fundamental	claims he	makes	about	the	value	of	rationality	and	the	sense	in	which	we	ought	to	be	rational. Nevertheless, given the	well-known	objections that	Kolodny	and	others	have raised against	the	particular	thesis	that	rational	requirements	entail	reasons,	it	is	surprising that	this	implication	is	not	defended	or	even	discussed	in	this	book.	For	example,	the book	contains	no	discussion	of	the	worry	that	reason-entailing	rational	requirements would	license	unacceptable	bootstrapping,	nor	of	the	difficulty	of	identifying	a	reasongiving	fact	that	would	count	in	favor	of	satisfying	rational	requirements.	Wedgwood appears	to	think	that	he	does	not	need	to	worry	about	these	problems	because	he	does not	understand	the	normativity	of	rationality	in	terms	of	reasons.	But	since	his	view implies	that	rational	requirements	entail	reasons,	the	problems	seem	to	apply	to	it. Let's	have	a	closer	look	at	how	Wedgwood	understands	his	two	principles.	Given the	innumerable	senses	of	'ought'	that	his	account	generates,	which	one	is	the	sense	in which	we	ought	to	do	what's	rationally	required?	Wedgwood	tells	us	that	"the	kind	of 'ought'	implied	by	rational	requirements	is	a	subjective	or	information-relative	'ought'" (61). This means that the relevant probability distribution, which is an essential ingredient	of	every	'ought'-proposition	according	to	Wedgwood's	theory,	is	"in	some way	determined	by	the	totality	of	the	agent's	mental	states"	(59). 5 But	what	is	the	value	that	determines	the	'ought'	of	rationality?	Prima	facie,	one might think that it should be overall value. However, this view runs into trouble because it generates what are sometimes called "reasons of the wrong kind" for attitudes, while Wedgwood accepts (along with many others) that rationality is insensitive to such	reasons (52).	For	example, if	having	an	epistemically	unjustified belief	promises	certain	benefits,	this	belief	might	be	required	by	a	subjective	'ought' that	is	relativized	to	overall	value,	but	this	does	not	seem	to	show	that	such	a	belief would	be	rational.	Therefore,	the	'ought'	entailed	by	rational	requirements	cannot	be the	'ought'	that	tells	us	to	maximize	expected	overall	value. So	what	is	the	relevant	value	that	determines	the	sense	in	which	we	ought	to	be rational	instead?	Wedgwood	promises	to	answer	this	question	in	chapter	6,	in	which he	puts	forward	the	eponymous	claim	of	his	book,	namely	that	"rationality	is	itself	a kind	of	value,	a	way	in	which	mental	events	or	collections	of	mental	states	can	be	good" (136).	According	to	Wedgwood,	rationality	is	a	value	because	rationality	is	a	virtue	– "broadly akin to the cardinal virtues of justice, wisdom, courage, and temperance" (200).	Like	these	other	virtues,	rationality	"involves	three	related	kinds	of	goodness:	i.) the	goodness	of	a	disposition;	ii.)	the	goodness	of	the	performances	that	manifest	this disposition; iii.) the 'abstract' goodness of the performances that this disposition normally	produces" (141).	These	kinds	of goodness	are	not relative to	purposes	or standards, but "non-relative or absolute" values (201). Against this backdrop, Wedgwood proposes to understand rational requirements, in analogy to other requirements	of	virtue,	as	claims	about	what	is	necessary	to	be	as	rational	as	possible (149-151).	On	this	approach,	a	rational	requirement	is	"a	kind	of	'must',	not	a	kind	of 'ought'"	(150). However,	given	the	axiological	assumption	that	rationality	is	a	value,	it follows from Wedgwood's account of 'ought' that rational requirements are "necessarily	coextensive	with	a	kind	of	'ought'"	(151). As far as I can see, however, this 'ought' is not the subjective or informationrelative 'ought' that Wedgwood announced earlier in his book as constituting the 'ought' of rationality (see, e.g., 18 and 61). For an 'ought' that is implied by a requirement	of	virtue	is	one	that	tells	us	to	maximize	an	actual	value	relative	to	the omniscient probability function (cf. 150), not one that tells us to maximize some expected value relative to a limited epistemic standpoint. It thus turns out that 6 Wedgwood's	'ought'	of	rationality	is,	according	to	his	own	account,	a	fully	objective	one. This	is	not	by	itself	an	objection	to	his	view,	but	it	is	a	point	where	the	reader	might find it difficult to grasp how	Wedgwood's ideas about the 'ought' of rationality fit together	and	more	guidance	would	have	been	helpful. Indeed, the	subjective 'ought' that	we have been promised in the beginning as the 'ought' of rationality is never elucidated in the book and never	mentioned again after chapter 5 – a chapter that provides	a	detailed formal	apparatus for	understanding	more	or	less	subjective	and objective	'oughts'	in	general,	but	no	conception	of	the	'ought'	of	rationality	in	particular. This is particularly surprising because later chapters do in fact contain the material to identify	a	subjective 'ought' that is	entailed	by	rational	requirements. In chapters	8	and	9,	Wedgwood	develops	the idea	that	"rationality is	not	a	completely free-standing	value",	but	depends	on	its	connection	to	"the	value	of	correctness"	(230). Correctness is the property that an attitude has	when it satisfies a certain kind of external norm that applies constitutively to all attitudes of that type (or when it achieves its "external aim" as it is sometimes metaphorically described) (5). For example, "correctness for beliefs is a	matter of the truth of the proposition that is believed; and correctness for choices is a	matter of the feasibility and value of the course	of	action	that	is	chosen"	(242).	The	relation	between	rationality	and	correctness is	supposed	to	answer	what	Wedgwood	takes	to	be	the	most	significant	challenge	for the	view	that	rationality	is	normative,	namely	to	explain	what	is	good	about	the	kind	of merely	internal	coherence	that	rationality,	according	to	him	and	many	others,	amounts to.	In	a	nutshell,	his	answer	is	that	achieving	this	coherence	is	the	best	way	to	pursue the	external	value	of correctness, and in fact the	only	way to	pursue this	value in	a guided	way	(235). Now, in the course of chapter 9, Wedgwood maintains that "having correct attitudes	...	is	a	genuine	value"	(231),	and	that	"to	be	rational	is	to	do	as	well	as	possible at	minimizing	expected incorrectness" (217).	These claims seem to	entail (together with	Wedgwood's	semantics	for	'ought')	that	there	is,	after	all,	a	subjective	'ought'	that coincides with rational requirements – namely one that relates to the value of correctness	(rather	than	the	value	of	rationality)	and	a	probability	distribution	that represents	the	agent's	epistemic	perspective	(rather	than	the	omniscient	perspective). It	is	puzzling	that	Wedgwood	does	not	mention	this	himself.	Throughout,	he	speaks	of 7 the 'ought' entailed by rational requirements in the singular, and in chapter 6 he identifies this 'ought'	with an 'ought' that is related to the value of rationality – an 'ought'	which	his	own	account	classifies	as	an	objective	one.	He	never	states	the	fact that his theory actually delivers two kinds of 'ought' that are entailed by rational requirements:	an	objective	one	that	is	related	to	the	actual	value	of	rationality,	and	a subjective	one	that	is	related	to	the	expected	value	of	correctness. The	Value	of	Rationality	is	an	ambitious	and	thought-provoking	book,	which	will be read with great benefit by anyone interested in the theory of rationality. Wedgwood's	conception	of	rationality	as	an	internal	virtue	that	pursues	the	external aim of correctness is original and highly instructive. It promises to meet several desiderata of the current debate on rationality, by (i) giving a unified account of epistemic	and	practical	rationality,	(ii)	telling	us	something	informative	about	the	point of rationality rather than listing a number of intuitive requirements, and (iii) elucidating	the	sense	in	which	we	ought	to	be	rational	and	are	criticizable	if	we	aren't. But	Wedgwood's	book	will	not	only	arouse	the	interest	of	those	who	care	about	the normative	status	of	rationality.	In	fact,	The	Value	of	Rationality	covers	an	impressive range of topics and makes novel and systematically interesting contributions to a number of	other relevant philosophical topics, such as, for example, the distinction between	reasons	of	the	right	and	reasons	of	the	wrong	kind	(chapter	2),	the	principle that	'ought'	implies	'can'	(chapter	3),	and	the	general	structure	of	virtues	(chapter	6). No	doubt	this	book	will	have	a	lasting	impact	on	the	philosophical	debate,	and	quite rightly	so. As	I	already	indicated,	in	my	opinion	the	book	also	has	some	shortcomings.	One of	them	is	that	many	of	the	crucial	questions	that	Wedgwood's	theory	poses	and	many of	the	challenges	that	it	faces	are	only	briefly	discussed	(if	at	all),	while	at	the	same	time some	of the	chapters	of the	book	(particularly	chapters	3–5,	all	of	which	have	been published	as	self-standing	papers	before)	contain	detailed	elaborations	of	points	that seem to	be	only	of	secondary importance to the	book's central	question.	To	be fair, Wedgwood emphasizes several times that his book "is designed to be the first instalment	of	a	trilogy"	(1),	and	that	his	theory	"will	not	be	presented	in	full	until	the whole	trilogy	is	complete"	(5).	However,	given	the	passion	for	detail	that	Wedgwood 8 exhibits	with	respect	to	some	other,	less	central	issues,	it	can	at	times	be	frustrating	to be	put	off	with	respect	to	some	of	the	most	burning	questions	that	his	book	raises. For example,	Wedgwood's interesting proposal that rationality is a	matter of minimizing	expected incorrectness faces the challenge to	explain	how	paradigmatic instances of structural irrationality, such as means/end-incoherence or akrasia, constitute	a	violation	of	the	requirement	to	minimize	expected	incorrectness.	This	is an important challenge,	not	only	because	accounting for such	cases seems to	be	an independently	plausible test	case for	any	conception	of	rationality,	but	also	because Wedgwood	would be talking past Broome,	Kolodny and others if his conception of rationality	did	not	apply	to the	paradigmatic	cases	of irrationality	with	which	these authors	are	concerned.	Wedgwood	spends	less	than	three	pages	on	this	issue	(232–4), which	do	not	mention	the	(arguably	most	difficult)	case	of	means/end-incoherence. The explanation of akrasia essentially relies	on the assumption that akratic agents, while	intending	some	action	A,	"rationally	have	the	maximum	degree	of	confidence"	in the	proposition	that	"it	is	better,	all	things	considered,	to	choose	an	alternative	B	rather than	to	choose	A"	(234).	However,	it	also	seems	akratic	to	intend	A	while	having	a	less than fully confident	belief in that	proposition,	or	a less than fully rational	belief (or both). Indeed, only very exceptional cases of akrasia will satisfy Wedgwood's restrictions,	and	it	is	for	good	reasons	that	the	philosophical	literature	has	focused	on a	much	more	general	phenomenon. It is thus	very	natural to	ask	how	Wedgwood's conception	of	rationality	treats	the	vast	majority	of	cases	of	akrasia	in	which	the	belief is not rationally held with maximum confidence. But Wedgwood skims over this question;	he jumps	to	the	conclusion	that	his	characterization	of	rationality	"has	no difficulty	explaining"	the	rational	requirement	that	bans	akrasia	(234). Another set of questions that the book raises but does not address concerns normative conflicts.	According to	Wedgwood's conception	of	normativity, there is a variety	of	values	and	an	infinite	number	of	senses	of	'ought'	and	'reason',	all	of	which can	issue	conflicting	directives.	For	example,	the	value	of	rationality	can	conflict	with the	value	of	correctness,	or	with	the	value	of	pleasure,	or	with	other	values.	Relative	to each	of these	values, there	will	be	objective	senses	of 'ought' that	give incompatible prescriptions,	not	to	mention	the	innumerable	less	objective	senses	of	'ought'.	It	looks like	this	will	have	devastating	effects	on	practical	reasoning,	unless	there	is	a	privileged 9 notion of 'ought' and 'reason' that determines the correctness conditions for deliberative	conclusions.	Are	there	such	privileged	notions	–	and	how	are	they	related to	the	rational	'ought'? Wedgwood is almost completely silent on such questions. There is one brief passage in	which	he	mentions	the	view	that	"when	virtues	[like justice	and	charity] conflict,	they	can	be	weighed	against	each	other,	to	determine	what	is	the	right	thing for	the	agent	to	do	all	things	considered",	and	he	maintains	that	"rationality	does	not just	count	as	one	virtue	among	many	in	this	way"	(201).	This	strikes	me	as	exactly	right, which	is	one	of	the	reasons	why	I	favor	a	conception	of	rationality	as	the	capacity	to respond to reasons – the reasons, if you see the need for this qualification, that correspond to the notion of 'ought' pertinent in conclusions of deliberation. It is difficult	to	see,	however,	how	Wedgwood's	account,	according	to	which	rationality	is	a matter	of	pursuing	one	particular	kind	of	value	among	many	others,	can	account	for	this special,	non-conflicting	status	of	rationality.	What	he	says	is	that	"the	requirements	of rationality	are	decisive"	(202)	with	respect	to	every	'ought'	that	is	"(a)	internalist	..., and	(b)	determined	purely	by	'reasons	of	the	right	kind'	for	the	attitude	in	question" (201–2). But Wedgwood told us before that 'oughts' aren't really determined by reasons at all, but by values and probabilities (in fact, he even told us that talk of reasons is best avoided). As far as I can see, the values relevant for 'oughts' that correspond to 'reasons of the right kind' seem to be the values of rationality or correctness.	So,	what	Wedgwood	tells	us	is	that	rational	requirements	do	not	conflict with	(certain	kinds	of)	'oughts'	that	are	determined	by	the	value	of	rationality	or	the value of correctness. But surely, the requirements of justice or charity also do not conflict	with	certain	kinds	of 'oughts'	that	are	determined	by	the	values	of	justice	or charity. It's thus not clear how we	made any progress towards understanding the special status of rationality that would explain why rationality isn't simply to be weighed	against	other	values. In the immediately following passage, Wedgwood seems to suggest that the special normative status	of rationality is due to its inescapability as a "constitutive virtue	of	thought"	(202).	But	it	is	difficult	to	see	why	the	descriptive	or	conceptual	fact (if	it	is	a	fact)	that	"all	thinkers	have	at	least	some	disposition	to	conform	to	the	most 10 basic	requirements	of	rationality"	(202)	should	be	taken	to	support the	assumption that	rationality	is	(in	some	sense)	normatively	decisive. A further	general	worry	that	one	might	have	with	this	book is that,	at	bottom, Wedgwood	seems	to	take	for	granted	his	most	important	claims	rather	than	arguing for	them.	The	central	claim	that	rationality	is	a	value,	despite	being	summarized	as	a thesis	that	was	"argued"	(196)	and	"defended"	(200)	in	chapter	6,	is,	as	far	as	I	can	see, neither	argued	nor	defended	in	that	chapter,	but	simply	postulated.	In	later	chapters, Wedgwood	aims	to	explain	the	value	of	rationality	by	showing	how	it	is	related	to	the value of correctness. But again, the thesis that correctness is a value is simply presupposed	as	"intuitively	clear"	(231).	Now,	there	is	nothing	wrong	in	principle	with starting a philosophical inquiry from assumptions that one takes to be intuitively plausible, but it seems that the claims that rationality and correctness are noninstrumentally valuable are in fact very controversial, especially in the dialectical context	at	issue.	For	example,	it	seems	to	me	far	from	obvious	that	the	mere	correctness of a belief in an utterly trivial truth makes belief in that proposition "genuinely valuable"	in	a	"non-relative	or	absolute	sense".	Moreover,	if	correctness	were	a	genuine absolute	value	of	this	sort,	this	would	seem	to	provide	practical	reasons	to	change	the facts	in	such	ways	that	they	make	our	beliefs	true,	no	less	than	reasons	to	adjust	our beliefs	to	the	facts.	Intuitively,	however,	there	are	no	such	practical	reasons	to	change the facts in order to make our beliefs correct. Perhaps worries like these can be resolved.	But	in	order	to	be	resolved,	they	need	to	be	addressed.	I	would	have	liked	to seen	Wedgwood	do	more	to	substantiate	his	controversial	axiological	assumptions	and defend	them	in	light	of	such	potential	problems.* BENJAMIN	KIESEWETTER Humboldt	University	of	Berlin * I would like to thank Jan Gertken, Felix Koch, Andy Mueller, Thomas Schmidt, Sebastian	Schmidt, Jonathan	Way	and	Ralph	Wedgwood	for	comments	on	an	earlier draft. Work on this review was supported by the DFG-project "Principles of the Deliberative	Ought". 11 References Broome,	John.	2013.	Rationality	Through	Reasoning.	Chichester:	Wiley-Blackwell. Kiesewetter,	Benjamin.	2017.	The	Normativity	of	Rationality.	Oxford:	Oxford	University Press. Kolodny,	Niko.	2005.	"Why	Be	Rational?"	Mind	114	(455):	509–63. Wedgwood,	Ralph.	2017.	The	Value	of	Rationality.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press.